Distribution of goals addressed to a group of agents by Cholvy, Laurence & Garion, Christophe
Distribution of Goals Addressed to a Group of Agents
Laurence Cholvy
ONERA Centre de Toulouse
2 av. ´Edouard Belin
31055 Toulouse, France
cholvy@cert.fr
Christophe Garion
SUPAERO
10 av. ´Edouard Belin
31055 Toulouse, France
garion@supaero.fr
ABSTRACT
The problem investigated in this paper is the distribution of
goals addressed to a group of rational agents. Those agents
are characterized by their ability (i.e. what they can do),
their knowledge about the world and their commitments.
The goals of the group are represented by conditional pref-
erences. In order to deduce the actual goals of the group,
we determine its ability using each agent’s ability and we
suppose that the agents share a common knowledge about
the world. The individual goals of an agent are deduced us-
ing its ability, the knowledge it has about the world, its own
commitments and the commitments of the other agents of
the group.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.4 [Knowledge Representation Formalisms andMeth-
ods]: Modal Logic; I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intel-
ligence]: Multiagent Systems
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
modal logic, qualitative decision theory, multiagent systems,
goal selection and theories of rational agency
1. INTRODUCTION
Reaching a complex goal often needs many agents. This
group of agents depends on the goal’s characteristics, like
for instance its complexity, the time needed to achieve it
etc. But it also depends on the agents’ characteristics, like
their abilities, their capacities, their desires etc.
In such a context, several problems arise: we may for
instance wonder how to build an agents coalition when a
single agent is not sufficient to achieve a given task [17]. We
may also try to optimize the number of agents.
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In this paper, we address a different problem. It assumes
that a goal, describing more or less preferred situations,
is allocated to a given group of agents. It also assumes a
model of agents, describing each agent of that group by its
knowledge about the current situation, its abilities and its
commitments. It defines a characterization of the most pre-
ferred situation which can be achieved by the group and it
also defines a way to assign each agent of the group with its
individual goals in order to reach that situation.
Let us note that this problem is not to determine the goals
of the group given the goals of each agent (cf. [15]).
In the mono-agent case, the derivation of a rational agent’s
goals depends on notions like belief, preference, capacity...
Two main approaches to reason with rational agents have
emerged those last ten years: BDI approaches (cf. for in-
stance [16, 20, 11, 18, 9]) and qualitative versions of classical
decision theory [19].
The solution described here is based on the solution pro-
vided by Boutilier in [2], who addresses these questions in
the case of a single agent in a qualitative decision theory
framework. In his paper, Boutilier assumes a set of condi-
tional preferences expressing a goal for a single agent. He
then describes a way to define the actual goals of the agent,
given what it knows (or more exactly, what it believes) and
given what it controls.
Boutilier justifies the use of a logic of conditional prefer-
ences to express and reason about goals: A goal is typically
taken to be some proposition that we desire an agent to make
true. [...] Unfortunately, goals are not always achievable.
My robot’s goal to bring me coffee may be thwarted by a bro-
ken coffee maker. [...] Furthermore, goals may be defeated
for reasons other than inability. It is often natural to specify
general goals, but list exceptional circumstances that make
the goal less desirable than the alternatives. [...] Rather
than a categorical distinction between desirable and undesir-
able situations, we will rank worlds according to their degree
of preference. The most preferred worlds correspond to goal
states in the classical sense. However, when such states are
unreachable, a ranking on alternatives becomes necessary.
Our aim is to extend Boutilier’s formalism to the multi-
agent case in order to determine the goals of each agent
knowing the conditional preferences imposed to the group.
In this work, we take into account three features to model
the agents: their beliefs about the current world, assuming
that they share the same beliefs, their capacity to change the
truth value of a proposition (we extend the controllability
model proposed by Boutilier) and their commitments.
The goal distribution process described in the following
must be viewed as managed by a central authority which
knows all those data. This authority must allocate to each
agent some tasks which validate a part of the group’s goals.
Those tasks are constrained by the agent’s capacities, but
also by its commitments and the other agents’ commitments.
We do not study here the possible communication problems
between the agents and particularly the problem of negoti-
ation in a group of agents (cf. [14, 12]).
The notion of commitments, which does not appear in
Boutilier’s work, is modeled here with sets of propositional
formulas, although it can be modeled with modal logic [18].
We choose this representation in order to focus on the goal
distribution problem.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the QDT logic and we present our extension to Boutilier’s
controllability notion. We then turn our interest to the goal
derivation process for a single agent. In section 3, we ex-
tend those notions to the multi-agent case, by extending the
notion of controllability and goals to a group of agents. In
section 4, we define the notion of commitment for a single
agent and we present how to determine the effective goals of
an agent and some properties of our formalism. Section 5 il-
lustrates the goal derivation process on an example. Finally,
section 6 is devoted to a discussion.
2. QUALITATIVE DECISION THEORY:
REFINEMENT OF BOUTILIER’S
APPROACH
Qualitative Decision Theory (QDT) is a qualitative ver-
sion of classical decision theory [19]. Decision theory is a
formalism whose aim is to determine a rational agent’s goals
given its preferences and its knowledge about the world. In
classical decision theory, preferences are represented by util-
ity functions on possible outcomes of actions and knowledge
about the world is represented by a probability distribution
on possible worlds. Boutilier proposed in [2] to use a modal
logic called QDT to represent and reason about those two
notions. This is done in a qualitative way, whereas clas-
sical decision theory uses numerical probability and utility
functions that might not be available.
2.1 The QDT logic
To represent preferences, Boutilier uses a modal logic called
QDT based on his logic CO [1]. Boutilier considers a propo-
sitional quadrimodal language LB based on a set of atomic
propositional variables PROP with the usual connectives
and four modal operators P ,
←
P , N and
←
N . The
semantics of QDT is based on Kripke models of the form
M = 〈W,≤P ,≤N , val〉 where :
• W is a set of possible worlds.
• ≤P is a total preference preorder on W (a reflexive
and transitive relation on W 2. If w and w′ are two
worlds of W , then w ≤P w′ means that w is at least
as preferred as w′.
• ≤N is a total normality preorder on W . If w and w′
are two worlds of W , w ≤N w′ means that w is at least
as normal a situation as w′.
• val is a valuation function on W 1. For any formula ϕ
1I.e. val : PROP → 2W and val is such that val(¬ϕ) =
W − val(ϕ) and val(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = val(ϕ1) ∩ val(ϕ2).
of W , val(ϕ) is the set of worlds of W which classically
satisfy ϕ.
For any CO-model M = 〈W,≤P , val〉, the truth condi-
tions for the modal connectives P and
←
P are:
• M |=w Pϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W such that w′ ≤P w then
M |=w′ ϕ.
• M |=w←P ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W such that w′ 	≤P w then
M |=w′ ϕ.
The truth conditions for N and
←
N are the same sub-
stituting ≤P by ≤N .
Pϕ (resp. Nϕ) is true at a world w if and only if ϕ is
true at all worlds at least as preferred (resp. normal) as w
(including w).
←
 ϕ (resp.
←
N ϕ) is true at world w if and
only if ϕ is true at all the worlds less preferred (resp. normal)
than w. Boutilier then defines two dual modal operators :
Pϕ ≡def ¬P¬ϕ means that ϕ is true at some equally
or more preferred world and
←
P ϕ ≡def ¬ ←P ¬ϕ means
that ϕ is true at some less preferred world. N and
←
N
are defined in the same way.
↔
P ϕ ≡def Pϕ∧ ←P ϕ and
↔
P ϕ ≡def Pϕ∨ ←P ϕ correspond respectively to classical
necessity and possibility (cf. [4]). Notice that
↔
N and
↔
N
defined in the same way are such that |=↔N ϕ ↔↔P ϕ and
|=↔N ϕ ↔↔P ϕ.
The validity of a formula ϕ is defined as follows: let M =
〈W,≤P , val〉 be a CO-model. A formula ϕ is valid in M
(noted M |= ϕ) iff ∀w ∈W M |=w ϕ. ϕ is CO-valid (noted
|=CO ϕ) iff for any CO-model M, M |= ϕ. ϕ is satisfaisable
iff ¬ϕ is not valid.
If Σ is a set of QDT formulas and ϕ a QDT formula,
then Σ |= ϕ means that for every QDT model M M |=
Σ ⇒ M |= ϕ.
Conditional preferences are formulas of the form I(β|α)
which means that “ideally, if α is true, then β is true”. The
connective I(−|−) is defined by:
I(β|α) ≡def↔P ¬α∨ ↔P (α ∧ (Pα→ β))
Thus, if we consider a CO-model M, I(β|α) will be valid
in M iff either α is false at every world of W , either there
is some world w which satisfies α and such that every world
at least as preferred as w satisfies α→ β.
An absolute preference β is expressed as I(β|) and noted
I(β).
In the same way, Boutilier introduces a new normative
conditional connective ⇒ defined in the same way using ←
and
←
N :
α ⇒ β ≡def ↔N ¬α∨ ↔N (α ∧ N (α→ β))
α⇒ β means that β is true at the most normal α-worlds
(it can be viewed as a default rule).
2.2 World representation and default knowl-
edge
Boutilier considers KB, a knowledge base, which repre-
sents (partially) the state of the actual world.
Definition 1. KB is a finite and consistent set of propo-
sitional formulas.
As in classical decision theory, Boutilier does not require
goals to be based on certain beliefs in KB, but also on rea-
sonable default conclusions. For instance, if the agent knows
that the weather is cloudy, then it can reasonably deduces
that the situation in which it is raining is more likely (or
normal) than the situation in which it is sunny.
Given a set N of formulas of the form α ⇒ β and a
knowledge base KB, Boutilier defines the default closure of
KB :
Definition 2. Cl(KB) = {ϕ ∈ LPROP : N |= KB ⇒
ϕ} where LPROP is the propositional sublanguage based on
PROP .
Cl(KB) is the agent’s set of default conclusions given
some representation KB of the actual world. Cl(KB) can
be viewed as the closure by ⇒ of KB.
2.3 Goals of an agent
Boutilier determines the goal of an agent by using its pref-
erences and its knowledge about the world. More precisely,
an agent ought to act as if its default knowledge Cl(KB)
were true (not as if only KB were true). Intuitively, the
goals of an agent will be some propositions which are true
in the most preferred situations.
2.3.1 Ideal goals
Ideal goals are a first approximation : they are the propo-
sitions which are true in the most preferred situations where
Cl(KB) is true.
Definition 3. Let P be a set of conditional preferences.
An ideal goal derived from P is a proposition ϕ such that:
P |= I(ϕ|Cl(KB))
Notice that the ideal goals do not provide what the agent
should do, because this requires the introduction of capabil-
ity notion.
Example 1. Let us consider a propositional language whose
variables are l (the door is lacquered) and s (the door is
sanded). Let P = {I(l), I(¬l|¬s)} be a set of preferences
meaning that:
• the agent prefers the door to be lacquered.
• if the door is not sanded, the agent prefers it not to be
lacquered.
Let us suppose also that N = {sh ⇒ s}, i.e. that in the
most normal situations, if there are shavings on the ground
then the door is sanded.
In order to simplify the problem, as preferences do not
concern sh, we will only consider the worlds which concern
l and s to determine the agent’s goals. The possible worlds
are w1 = {l, s}, w2 = {¬l,¬s}, w3 = {l,¬s}, w4 = {¬l, s}.
The worlds w2 and w4 cannot be the most preferred worlds,
because of I(l). But, because of I(¬l|¬s), w3 cannot be the
most preferred world. So in every model of P , w1 is the most
preferred world and so w1 ≤P w2, w1 ≤P w3 and w1 ≤P w4.
More, w3 ≤P w2 cannot hold, because I(¬l|¬s) ∈ P . So
w2 ≤P w3. I(l) and I(¬l|¬s) are valid only in the following
QDT -model2:
2In fact, we only consider the QDT -model for which
↔
 ϕ
holds for any satisfaisable proposition ϕ.
M1 w1 ≤P w2 ≤P w3 ≤P w4
M2 w1 ≤P w2 ≤P w4 ≤P w3
M3 w1 ≤P w2 ≤P w4 ≤P w3
M4 w1 ≤P w4 ≤P w2 ≤P w3
Let us suppose that KB1 = {sh} (there are shavings
on the ground and this is known by the agent). Then
Cl(KB1) = {sh, s} because sh ⇒ s. The ideal goals for
the agent are the α such that ∀M M |= I(α|sh ∧ s). l is
then the only ideal goal for the agent: as the door is nor-
mally sanded, the agent should lacquer it.
Now, if we consider that KB2 = {¬s, sh} (the door is not
sanded but there are shavings on the ground, which does
not contradict the normality rule sh ⇒ s), only one ideal
goal can be deduced: ¬l. As the door is not sanded, the
agent should not lacquer it.
2.3.2 CK-goals
Ideal goals represent the fact that the agent should reach
the best situation given a certain knowledge about the world.
But this definition is too restrictive for two reasons:
• to determine the goals of an agent, only the elements
of KB which are fixed should be used. If an agent
can change the truth value of an atom in KB, then
this atom should not be taken into account in the goal
derivation process. In particular, as for any formula
ϕ and any QDT -model M M |= I(ϕ|ϕ) holds, every
atom in KB is an ideal goal for the agent.
• ideal goals represent some desired situations that the
agent should reach. They do not represent what the
agent should do. An agent may prefer that it rains
for instance. It is intuitively correct to suppose that
the agent does not have any control on rain. In this
case, it seems correct to consider “it rains” as an ideal
situation, but not as a goal for the agent.
In order to refine the goal notion, Boutilier introduces a
simple model of action and ability to demonstrate its in-
fluence on conditional goals. He suggests partitioning the
atomic propositions in two classes : P = C ∪C, in which C
is the set of atomic propositions that the agent can control
(i.e. the agent can change the truth value of those proposi-
tions) and C is the set of atomic propositions that the agent
cannot control.
For instance the atomic proposition representing the fact
the agent lacquers the door can be considered as controllable.
The atomic proposition representing the fact it rains can
reasonably be considered as uncontrollable.
We think that Boutilier’s ability model is too restrictive.
For instance, if an agent controls s which represents the fact
that the door is sanded, then it controls also ¬s. The agent
which can sand the door can also “unsand” the door. This
is a bit controversial.
To solve this problem, we extend Boutilier’s model by
partitioning the literals of the language. Intuitively, a literal
l is controllable by the agent iff:
• if the current situation is such that l is false, then the
agent can by one of its actions make l and only l true.
• if the current situation is such that l is true, then the
agent can keep l true by one of its actions or by doing
nothing.
Definition 4. Let C be the set of literals which are con-
trollable by the agent and C the set of literal which are
uncontrollable by the agent.
We then extend this definition as follows3 :
Definition 5. Let w and w′ be two worlds of W . Let us
note w′ − w = {l : w′ |= l, w |= ¬l and l is a literal}. A
proposition ϕ is:
• controllable iff ∀w ∈W (w |= ¬ϕ∃w′ ∈ W w′ |= ϕ and
(w′ − w) ⊆ C);
• influenceable iff ∃w ∈ W (w |= ¬ϕ∃w′ ∈ W w′ |= ϕ
and (w′ − w) ⊆ C).
In this case, ϕ is influenceable in w.
• uninfluenceable iff it is not influenceable.
A world w ∈W is a context for some influenceable propo-
sition ϕ iff ϕ is influenceable in w or w |= ϕ.
The contexts of an influenceable proposition ϕ are the
worlds in which either ϕ is false but the agent can change
the valuations of some controllable literal to make ϕ true,
or the worlds in which ϕ is already true.
A controllable proposition is a proposition ϕ the agent is
able to make true from a situation in which ϕ is false by
changing only the valuation of some controllable literals. If
the current situation is such that ϕ is true, then the agent
can keep this situation by the definition of controllable liter-
als. Every world of W is a context for a controllable propo-
sition.
An influenceable proposition is a proposition ϕ the agent
can make true only from some initial situations. For in-
stance, if a ∈ C and if b ∈ C then a ∧ b is influenceable, but
not controllable. As b is not controllable, if b is false, then
the agent cannot make a∧b true, so a∧b is not controllable.
But if b is true and a is false, the agent can make a∧ b true
so a ∧ b is influenceable. The contexts of a ∧ b are in this
case {a, b} and {¬a, b}.
We can now redefine the notion of CK goal (Complete
Knowledge goal) introduced by Boutilier in [2]. The CK
goals of the agent will be determined from the set of propo-
sitions ϕ which are true in Cl(KB) and such that Cl(KB) is
not a context for ¬ϕ. The truth value of those propositions
cannot be changed by the agent’s actions and they will re-
main true. Moreover, the CK goals will only be propositions
ϕ for which Cl(KB) is a context, because either ϕ is false
in Cl(KB) and the agent can change the truth value of ϕ,
either ϕ is true in Cl(KB) and the agent can keep the truth
value of ϕ. We first define the non-contextual propositions
of KB:
Definition 6. The set on non-contextual propositions of
KB is defined by:
NC(KB) = {ϕ ∈ Cl(KB) : Cl(KB) is not a context for ¬ϕ}
We suppose here that NC(KB) is complete, i.e. that
the agent knows the truth value of all the literals for which
Cl(KB) is not a context.
3We have respected the notations of Boutilier in [2].
Definition 7. Let P be a set of conditional preferences. ϕ
is a CK goal given P iff P |= I(ϕ|NC(KB)) and Cl(KB) is
a context for ϕ.
We can also determine the agent’s “minimal” atomic ac-
tions:
Definition 8. Let P be a set of conditional preferences.
A set of atomic goals is a set of controllable literals L =
{l1, . . . , ln} such that:
• ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} Cl(KB) is a context for li.
• for all CK goal ϕ given P , P |= NC(KB) ∧ L → ϕ.
Example 2. Let us resume the previous example. Let us
suppose that P = {I(l), I(¬l|¬s)} and N = {sh ⇒ s}.
Assume that KB = {¬s} (the door is not sanded) and
that the agent controls both l and s (he can sand the door
and lacquer it). ¬s ∈ Cl(KB) and s is controllable so
Cl(KB) is a context for s. So NC(KB) = φ. In this case,
the potential CK goals are l and s. As Cl(KB) is a context
for s, s is a CK goal. Cl(KB) is also a context for l, because:
• either the door is not lacquered and the agent can lac-
quer it.
• either the door is lacquered and the agent can do noth-
ing.
Thus, l is a CK goal for the agent. The atomic goals set
of the agent is {l, p}. Let us remark that we find the same
results as Boutilier’s approach in [2].
Let us suppose now that P = {I(l|s), I(¬l|¬s)} (in this
case, the ideal world is not a l world in every model). Let us
suppose that the agent controls l and s, and that KB = {s}.
In this case, as the agent does not control ¬s, Cl(KB) is not
context for ¬s, so NC(KB) = {s}. The atomic goals set is
{l, s}: the agent “should” keep the door sanded and lacquer
it. Let us remark that with Boutilier’s definition of CK
goals, the only CK goals deducible in this case are s → l
et ¬s → ¬l. Our formalism better represents the decision
process of the agent.
3. EXTENSION TO THE MULTI-AGENT
CASE
In the following, we will consider a finite set of agents
A = {a1, . . . , an}.
Example 3. Let us consider the following scenario. The
following preferences are assigned to a group of two agents
{a1, a2}:
• if the door is sanded, then it should be lacquered and
not covered with paper.
• if the door is not sanded, then it should be covered
with paper and not lacquered.
The representation with QDT of this scenario is: P =
{I(l ∧ ¬p|s), I(p ∧ ¬l|¬s)}.
If we take as a model the mono-agent formalism devel-
oped in the previous section, we have to know the group’s
influenceable propositions to deduce the CK goals of the
group. We will therefore extend the controllability notion
to a group of agents and then the CK goals of the group.
3.1 Controllability extension
For each agent of the group we have partitioned the lit-
erals of PROP into two classes: the literals controllable by
the agent and the literals uncontrollable by the agent. We
extend this proposition to the multi-agent case by emitting
two assumption. The first one is that each agent controls at
least one literal:
Assumption 1. ∀ai ∈ A Cai 	= φ
The second one is about the controllability domains of the
agents:
Assumption 2. The controllability domains of the agents
are not necessary disjoint.
A literal can be controllable by two distinct agents. In this
case, the two agents are “concurrent” to make this literal
true for instance.
We now define the notion of controllability for a group of
agents:
Definition 9. Let lit(PROP ) be the set of literals in the
propositional language. the set of controllable literals by the
group of agents is C =
 
ai∈A
and the set of uncontrollable
literals by the group of agents is C = lit(PROP )− C.
The extension to propositions is the same as in definition
5.
Let us take an example: a group of agents {a1, a2} is such
that p is controllable by a1 and r is controllable by a2. Is
(p ∨ q) ∧ (r ∨ s) controllable by the group ?
In this case, as p is controllable by a1 and r is controllable
by a2, (p∨q)∧(r∨s) is controllable by {a1, a2}. The worlds
that do not satisfy (p ∨ q)∧ (r ∨ s) are worlds which satisfy
¬p or ¬r. As p and r are controllable by {a1, a2}, the group
can keep or make p and r true.
(p∧q)∨(r∧s) is only influenceable: the worlds that satisfy
¬q ∧ ¬s are not contexts for (p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s). The contexts
of (p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ s) are the worlds that satisfy (q ∨ s).
3.2 CK goals of the group
We can now define the notion of CK goal for a group of
agents. We must precise the definitions of KB and NC(KB)
in the multi-agent case.
The definition of KB in the multi-agent case is not easy.
For an agent, KB represents the beliefs it has about the ac-
tual world. Thus two agents may have contradictory beliefs.
In this case, it seems to be difficult to determine a common
KB for the group4. We will suppose that the agents in A
share the same world representation.
Assumption 3. The agents of A share the same world rep-
resentation. This representation is characterized by a finite
and consistent set of propositional formulas noted KB.
The representation of the world for the group of agents is
also KB.
The set of non-contextual propositions of KB is defined
in the same way as in the mono-agent case. As in the mono-
agent case, we assume that the group knows the truth value
of all the literals for which Cl(KB) is not a context. The
definition of a CK goal for A is:
4Notice that we can use merging methods [13] to solve this
problem.
Definition 10. Let P be a set of conditional preferences.
ϕ is a CK goal for A iff P |= I(ϕ|NC(KB)) and KB is a
context for ϕ.
4. EFFECTIVE GOALS OF AN AGENT
We can now determine what are the tasks that each agent
must achieve in order to achieve the group’s goals. Let us
resume the example given in the beginning of section 3: in
the case where a1 can lacquer the door or cover it with paper
and a2 can sand it, we can suppose that a1’s task depends
on a2’s commitments . For instance, if a2 commits itself to
sand the door, a1 has the task to lacquer it.
4.1 Agents’ commitments
Given a literal controllable by an agent, the agent can
express three positions on this literal:
• the agent can express that it will do an action that
will keep or make this the literal true. We say that the
agent commits itself to achieve the literal.
• the agent can express that it will not do an action that
can make the literal true. We will say that the agent
commits itself not to achieve the literal.
• finally, the agent can express nothing about the lit-
eral. We will say that the agent does not commit itself
neither to achieve the literal nor not to achieve the
literal.
To represent the commitments of each agent ai, we will
use three subsets of Cai : Com+,ai , Com−,ai and Pai . We
define them in the following way:
• if l is a literal, if l is controllable by ai and l ∈ Com+,ai ,
it means that “the agent ai commits itself to achieve
l”;
• if l is a literal, if l is controllable by ai and l ∈ Com−,ai ,
it means that “the agent ai commits itself not to achieve
l”.
• Pai = Cai−(Com+,ai∪Com−,ai) is the set of control-
lable literals by ai and for which ai does not commit
itself to anything (i.e. ai does not commit itself neither
to achieve them nor not to achieve them).
We impose two constraints on those sets.
Constraint 1. ∀ai ∈ A Com+,ai is consistent.
Constraint 2. ∀ai ∈ A Com+,ai ∩ Com−,ai = φ
Those two constraints express a kind of consistency for
the agent’s commitments. The first constraint express the
fact that an agent does not commit itself to achieve both l
and ¬l. The second constraint express the fact that an agent
cannot commit itself both to achieve l and not to achieve l.
Definition 11. Com+,A is the set of positive commitments
of the agents:
Com+,A =
 
ai∈A
Com+,ai
Com−,A is the set of “negative” commitments of the agents:
Com−,A = {l ∈ KB : ∀ai ∈ A ¬l controllable by ai ⇒
¬l ∈ Com−,ai}
The meaning of Com−,A is the following: if all the agents
that control a literal l commit themselves not to achieve l
and ¬l ∈ KB, we will consider that ¬l will remain true. We
suppose that there is no external intervention.
An hypothesis that we do on the agents’ commitments is:
every CK goal of A is consistent with the union of Com+,A
and of Com−,A.
Assumption 4. For every formula ϕ such that
P |= I(ϕ|NC(KB)) and KB is a context for ϕ, then :
Com−,A ∪ Com+,A ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
This restriction allows to eliminate some problematic cases
like:
• the case where an agent which controls l commits itself
to achieve l and another one which controls ¬l commits
itself to achieve ¬l (i.e. Com+,A not consistent).
• the case where a literal, which is not consistent with
the group’s CK goals, is true in KB and will remain
true because the agents of the group which could make
it false do not commit themselves to it.
• the case where the positive and negative commitments
of the group are not consistent with some CK goal of
the group.
If we want to distribute goals to a group of agents, we
must first check the consistency of the agents’ commitments
with the group’s CK goals. If the consistency is not verified,
the agents must review their commitments. We do not solve
the possible conflicts between the agents’ commitments and
the group’s CK goals.
4.2 Effective goals
If the assumption 4 is verified, then the agents’ commit-
ments are consistent with the group’s CK goals. The goals
of each agent do not only depend on NC(KB), but also on
the commitments of the other agents. It seems to be intu-
itively correct to derive the effective goals of an agent ai ∈ A
from:
• the propositions of KB for which KB is not a context,
i.e. NC(KB).
• the set of positive commitments of the agents, i.e.
Com+,A.
• the set of “negative” commitments of the agents, i.e.
Com−,A.
We will denote the set of such formulas by D(KB). This
set will be used in the conditional part of I(−|−) to deduce
the effective goals of each agent.
Definition 12. We define:
D(KB) = NC(KB) ∪ Com+,A ∪ Com−,A
Property 1. D(KB) is consistent.
Proof. D(KB) = NC(KB) ∪ Com+,A ∪ Com−,A.
From hypothesis 4, Com+,A ∪ Com−,A is consistent.
NC(KB) is the set of formulas ϕ of Cl(KB) such that
KB is not a context for ¬ϕ. NC(KB) is consistent because
KB is consistent by definition.
Let us suppose that there is a literal l such that l ∈
NC(KB) and ¬l ∈ Com+,A∪Com−,A (as Com+,A∪Com−,A
is a set of literals, we can easily generalize this proof to the
formulas of NC(KB)). In this case, KB is not a context for
¬l. But, ¬l ∈ Com+,A ∪ Com−,A, thus ¬l is controllable.
Then by definition, KB is a context for ¬l (because l is a lit-
eral). Thus NC(KB)∪Com+,A∪Com−,A is consistent.
Note that this definition is arbitrary: we can also derive
the effective goals of each agent only from NC(KB) for
instance.
Now, we can define the notion of effective goal for an
agent:
Definition 13. Let P be a set of preferences addressed
to the group A. ϕ is an effective goal for ai, denoted by
EGoalai(ϕ), iff P |= I(ϕ|D(KB)) and KB is a context for
ϕ for ai.
As we use the I(−|−) operator, we are sure that an agent
cannot have contradictory goals. Like in the mono-agent
case, we can define an effective atomic goals set by trivially
extending definition 8.
It is also interesting to define the notion of unfulfillment
of a CK goal ϕ.
Definition 14. Let ϕ be a CK goal A. ϕ is not fulfilled
(noted Nonful(ϕ)) iff:

ai∈A
{ϕ′ : EGoalai(ϕ′)}   ϕ
Let us present some properties of the formalism.
Property 2. Let l be a literal of PROP . If l is a CK goal
of A, then ∃ai ∈ A such that EGoalai(l) holds.
Proof. Let l be a CK goal of the group A. By defi-
nition, Σ |= I(l|NC(KB)) and KB is a context for l (0).
Particularly, l is controllable by A.
Let us suppose that l is not an effective goal for any agent
of A. Thus, ∀ai ∈ A Σ 	|= I(l|D(KB)) or l is not controllable
by ai (because l is a literal, every KB is a context for it if l
is controllable).
As l is a literal, there is at least one agent ai of A which
controls l. So Σ 	|= I(l|D(KB)). Then:
∃M0,M0 |= Σ and M 	|= I(l|D(KB))
=⇒ M0 	|=↔ (D(KB) ∧ (D(KB) → l))
=⇒ ∀w ∈W M0, w 	|= D(KB) or ∃w′ ≤ w
M0, w
′ 	|= D(KB) → l
=⇒ ∀w ∈W M0, w |= D(KB) ⇒ ∃w′ ≤ w
M0, w
′ |= D(KB) ∧ ¬l (1)
(0) implies ∃w0 ∈ W M0, w0 |= UI(KB) and ∀w ≤
w0 M0, w |= UI(KB)→ l.
So, as UI(KB) ⊆ D(KB):
∃w0 ∈W M0, w0 |= UI(KB) and ∀w ≤ w0 M0, w |= D(KB) → l
Let w1 be a world such that w1 ≤ w0. From (1), if w1 |=
D(KB) then there is some w′ ∈ W such that w′ ≤ w1 and
w′ |= D(KB) ∧ ¬l. But w′ ≤ w0 (by transitivity of ≤) so
w′ |= D(KB) → l which is impossible.
Thus:
∀w ≤ w0 w |= ¬D(KB)
=⇒ ∀w ≤ w0 w |= ¬(UI(KB) ∧ (Com+,A ∧ Com−,A))
=⇒ ∀w ≤ w0 w |= UI(KB)→ ¬(Com+,A ∧ Com−,A)
But M0 |= I(l|UI(KB), so ∃w2 ∈ W M0, w2 |= UI(KB)
and ∀w ≤ w2 M0, w |= UI(KB)→ l.
So M0,min≤(w0, w2) |= l ∧¬(Com+,A ∧Com−,A)). This
contradicts hypothesis 4.
This property means that if l is a literal and a CK goal of
the group, then there is at least one agent which will have
for effective goal to achieve l. An immediate corollary of
this property is the following 5:
Property 3. Let l1, . . . , ln be n literals of PROP such that
l1∧ . . .∧ ln is a CK goal of A. Then ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∃ali ∈ A
such that EGoalali (li) holds.
For all the CK goals which are literals or conjunctions of
literals, the process previously defined assign effective goals
such that those CK goals are achieved.
5. EXAMPLE
Let us resume the previous example. The preferences im-
posed to the group {a1, a2} are:
• if the door is sanded, then it should be lacquered and
not covered with paper.
• if the door is not sanded, then it should be covered
with paper and not lacquered.
The representation of this scenario within QDT is the
following: P = {I(l ∧ ¬p|s), I(p ∧ ¬l|¬s)}. For each model
of P :
• I(l ∧ ¬p|s) means that there is a world which satisfies
s and such that all preferred worlds satisfy s→ l∧¬p.
• I(p∧¬l|¬s) means that there is a world which satisfies
¬s and such that all preferred worlds satisfy ¬s →
¬l ∧ p.
We suppose that there is no normality rules, so Cl(KB) =
KB. Let us present some scenarios:
1. Let us suppose that KB = {s,¬l,¬p} i.e. the agents
know that the door is sanded but not lacquered nor
covered with paper. Let suppose also that ¬s is un-
controllable by the agents (i.e. the agents have no
“means” to unsand the door), that Ca1 = {l} and
that Ca2 = {p,¬p} (i.e. a1 can lacquer the door, a2
can cover it with paper or remove the paper if neces-
sary).
In this case, NC(KB) = {s}, because KB is a context
for l and for p. l ∧ ¬p is a CK goal of the group6.
If the agents do not commit themselves to anything,
5Because if l1 ∧ . . .∧ lm is a CK goal of A, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l} li
is a CK goal of A.
6In fact, it is the only one that is interesting. We can also
deduce for instance that (l ∧ ¬p) ∨ p is a CK goal of the
group.
D(KB) = {s}, and then EGoala1(l) and EGoala2(¬p)
hold. a1 has for atomic goal set {l} (i.e. its only goal is
to lacquer the door) and a2 has {¬p} for atomic goals
set (i.e. its only goal is not to cover the door with
paper). This seems intuitively correct.
2. Let us suppose that KB = {¬s,¬l,¬p}, that Ca1 =
{l,¬l} and that Ca2 = {s, p,¬p}. In this case, NC(KB) =
φ and (l ∧ ¬p) ∨ (¬l ∧ p) is a CK goal of the group.
If D(KB) = φ (i.e. the agents do not commit them-
selves to anything), no effective goal can be derived,
because a2 controls s and could make s true. So,
Nonful((l ∧ ¬p) ∨ (¬l ∧ p)) holds.
But if a2 commits itself not to achieve s (i.e. it com-
mits itself not to sand the door), thenCom−({a1, a2} =
{¬s} and EGoala2(p) and EGoala1(¬l) can be de-
duced: a2 has for effective goal to cover the door with
paper and a1 has for effective goal to keep the door
unlacquered.
3. Let us suppose that KB = {¬s,¬l,¬p}, that Ca1 =
{l} and that Ca2 = {s, p}. In this case, NC(KB) = φ
and l ∨ p is a CK goal of the group. Let us sup-
pose also that a2 commits itself to achieve s, then
Com+(a2) = {p}. In this case, D(KB) = {s}, and
EGoala1(l) and EGoala2(s) hold. a1 should lacquer
the door, a2 should sand it. a2 does not have for ef-
fective goal not to cover the door with paper, because
it does not control ¬p.
4. Let us suppose that KB = {¬s,¬l,¬p}, that Ca1 =
{l} and that Ca2 = {s, p}. a2 commits itself to achieve
s, so Com+(a2) = {s} and a1 commits itself not to
achieve l, so Com−(a1) = {l}. In this case, NC(KB) =
φ, Com+({a1, a2}) = {s} andCom−({a1, a2}) = {¬l}.
Com+({a1, a2}) ∪ Com−({a1, a2}) ∪ {s → l} is not
consistent. But s → l is a CK goal of {a1, a2}, thus
hypothesis 4 is not verified. a1 and a2 must review
their commitments.
6. CONCLUSION
This work addresses the problem of deriving individual
goals from goals assigned to a group of agents and an agency
model for each agent. We have started from Boutilier’s log-
ical interpretation of decision theory. His formalism allows
to deduce the goals of a single agent knowing its preferences,
its abilities and its beliefs.
We have first focused on extending Boutilier’s model of
controllability, because we thought it was too restrictive.
Partitioning the atoms of the language into two classes (the
controllable atoms and the uncontrollable atoms) leads to
counterintuitive conclusions: for instance, if an agent can
sand the door, it can also unsand it. Our model is based
on a partition of the literal of the language and avoids such
conclusions.
We have then extended the controllability and CK goals
notions to a group of agents and defined the commitments
of a single agent using sets of literals. We were then able to
determine the effective goals of each agent of the group.
This work could be extended in many directions.
The agency model can be refined: we can for instance
suppose that the agents may have incomplete beliefs about
the uninfluenceable propositions or that they may not share
the same beliefs about the world. Indeed, the “common
knowledge” assumption is very strong. If we relax it, there
may be conflicts between the agents beliefs. We suggest
then to use some merging methods to solve such conflicts
(cf. [13, 6, 7]). Those methods are used to build a common
belief set from several belief sets which can be contradictory.
Moreover, Let us remark that the agents beliefs are in fact
knowledge, because we suppose implicitly that the beliefs of
the group of agents are true in the real world. We could
also suppose that the agents have “real” beliefs (so they can
be false in the actual world) and analyze the impact of this
assumption on our work.
It would be also interesting to compare the commitment
notion developed here with the notion of “controllable and
fixed” variables introduced in [5]. In this paper, we show
how Boutilier’s formalism can be adapted to reason with de-
ontic notions, particularly Contrary-to-Duties. The agency
model has been extended to deal correctly with this problem
by using two types of variables: the controllable and fixed
variables and the controllable and unfixed variables (follow-
ing Carmo and Jones’ terminology in [3]). The controllable
and fixed variables are variables that the agent controls, but
such that it does not decide to change the truth value of the
variable. This notion is close to commitment.
Let us notice also that the distribution process presented
here is not selective. Two agents that control both the same
literal have the same effective goal about this literal. For
instance, an agent a1 may have the effective goal to lacquer
to door and to sand it, and an agent a2 may have the ef-
fective goal to sand the door. In such a case, it may be
interesting to allocate only to a2 the task to sand the door.
We have worked on distribution strategies in order to avoid
such derivations, but due to lack of space, we cannot present
this in this paper. Those results are presented in [10].
Finally, a first study on collective responsibility and indi-
vidual obligation [8] could be integrated in this framework,
in order to deal with normative problems linked to the goals
distribution process.
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